EPESec

Modern V2X systems have an increasing number of interfaces that allow remote connectivity, but also include the risk of exposure to cyber threats. The attack surface for such threats is hence constantly increasing and in combination with privacy issues that may arise through the presence of sensitive data from users in the V2X ecosystem, this necessitates the requirement for security mechanisms. However, the existing mechanisms to ensure protection against such threats face major hurdles, such as 1) the lack of in-vehicle addressing schemes, 2) the abundance of V2X interfaces and 3) the manufacturer-specific architecture of each vehicle consisting of a variety of different systems. On top of these hurdles, a solution should satisfy the real-time requirements of the resource-constrained in-vehicle architecture by remaining lightweight and highly reliable as well as by avoiding false positive indications and alarms. This article presents a novel anomaly detection solution for addressing the main challenges of security mechanisms by simultaneously keeping a minimal impact on the real-time in-vehicle requirements. The solution is demonstrated through an Electric Vehicle (EV) charging hub testbed that implements anomaly detection schemes to detect proof-of-concept cyber-attacks targeting EV charging profile and causing cascading effects by zeroing the vehicle speed.

Model Based Security Engineering (MBSE) is a growing field of research, which is gaining popularity in the domain of Safety, Security, and Resilience Co-Engineering. The System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a method for systematically analyzing the behavior of complex systems to investigate their failure modes and the Unsafe Control Actions (UCA) that can lead to those failure modes. This paper expands the methodological scope of STPA, by including an iterative Root-Cause Analysis element, which examines the possible emergence of UCAs due to either malfunction, or malicious action. Output of the method are the attributes and constraints of Resilience Modes of system configuration and operation, named ''Cyber Safe Position`` (CSP). The proposed method is applied in the case study of a Photovoltaic Plant connected to a Virtual Power Plant (VPP).

With the ongoing shift to electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries are becoming essential components for vehicles. Battery management systems manages these batteries. While battery management systems typically used to be placed deep in the vehicle architecture, away from the external facing surface of vehicles, they are now more and more connected to backend systems, e.g., to improve monitoring battery properties and optimize charging. Hence, battery management systems have moved closer to the attack surface, increasing the risk of security incidents in these systems. Also, batteries will soon be reused in so-called second life applications, e.g., as an energy storage system in a private home. While conventional methods involve removing the battery and reusing it with a new battery management system, modern methods use the original battery management system. Security controls already exist in first and second life applications. However, there is a lack of research activities regarding the transition phase. This paper analyzes the phase of transferring the battery management system from the first to the second life of particular relevance for security, privacy, and intellectual property. We try to close this research gap by analyzing the security aspects of a battery management system life cycle and its altering system environment. We are defining the transition phase, identifying necessary activities, and providing cybersecurity needs for the transitioning of battery management system from first to second life.